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Anthony: Protection for Attorney Solicitation Slow in Coming

NOTES
PROTECTION FOR ATTORNEY SOLICITATION
SLOW IN COMING
INTRODUCrION

Under most state codes of professional responsibility, lawyers risk disciplinary action, including disbarment, for soliciting prospective clients, even
if the solicitation involves no element of coercion, deception, harassment, overreaching or fraud.' The essential element invoking disciplinary action is the
employment motive. 2 For example, if a lawyer seeks out an individual with
whom he has had no prior personal contact, and attempts to persuade that individual to employ him, he has violated the code of ethics in almost every
state.3 The lawyer commits the violation whether the direct communication to
the individual was made in person, by telephone, through the mail, or 4by a
specifically directed advertisement through newspapers, radio or television.
The constitutionality of code provisions forbidding solicitation has come
under attack in recent years by lawyers asserting first amendment free speech
rights.5 Three challenges to attorney regulation have been decided recently by
1. Most states follow the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Two code disciplinary rules prohibit most forms of solicitation.
"Recommendation of Professional Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not, except as authorized in DR 2-101(B), recommend employment as
a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a layperson who has not
sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR-2-104(A).

"Suggestion of Need of Legal Services.
(A) A lawyer who has given in-person unsolicited advice to a layperson that he should
obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice,

except that:
(1) A lawyer may accept employment by a close friend, relative, former client (if the
advice is germane to the former employment), or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes
to be a client." Id. DR 2-104(A)(l).
2. The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility does not prohibit a lawyer from giving
unrequested advice; it prohibits the acceptance of employment as a result of the unrequested
advice. ABA CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A). Likewise, the Code prohibits
a lawyer from recommending the employment of himself or an attorney from his firm. Id.
DR-103(A).
3.

DR 2-104(A)(1) grants an exception if the person solicited is a relative, close friend,

former client or client. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A)(1).
4. Each of these categories are analyzed separately in this Note.
5. The first amendment provides, in relevant part: "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment is applicable
to all states through the 14th amendment. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Speech containing a commercial element, such as that involved when an attorney solicits
a client for pecuniary gain, was once believed to be wholly outside the ambit of the first
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6
the United States Supreme Court: Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, Ohralik v.
7
Ohio State Bar Association, and In re Primus." These three cases provide a
framework for analyzing the constitutionality of current anti-solicitation code
0
provisions. 9 Unfortunately, these decisions have left many issues unresolved.

amendment. In Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), the Supreme Court established
what was known as the commercial speech doctrine, holding that "purely commercial advertising" by handbills did not warrant first amendment protection. Id. at 54. The death of
the commercial speech doctrine is linked primarily to two cases. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976). In Bigelow, the Supreme Court granted first amendment protection to paid commercial newspaper advertisements concerning the availability of abortions. The Court noted
that the Valentine decision did not exclude commercial speech from all first amendment protection; it merely held that the "manner" of commercial speech, such as the use of handbills,
could be regulated. 421 U.S. at 819. The next year in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court granted
first amendment protection to pharmacists who wanted to advertise prescription drug prices.
The Court stated that a consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information may
be greater than his interest in political expression, therefore commercial speech is deserving
of first amendment protection just as political speech has always been held deserving of protection. 425 U.S. at 763. See also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (state can forbid
optometrists from practicing under trade names, with two dissenters arguing that "wholly
truthful speech" should be protected); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n,
413 U.S. 376 (1973) (city can ban sex-designated ads because discrimination is illegal); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (first amendment protection given to political
advertisement in a libel suit); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 515, 531 (1945) (first amendment
safeguards are applicable to business and economic activity).
Commercial speech has been the subject of extensive commentary. See generally Baker,
Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REv. 1 (1976) (arguing
that first amendment should not protect commercial speech); Emerson, First Amendment
Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. R~v. 422, 460 (1980) (protecting commercial
speech may not be worth the cost); Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory,

74 N.W.L. REv., 372 (1979) (analyzing the propriety of allowing commercial speech regulations that violate the basic first amendment principle of content neutrality); Jackson &
Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 64 VA. L. REv.
1 (1979) (criticizing the Virgina Pharmacy decision as being wrongly decided); Reich, Preventing Deception in Commercial Speech, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 775 (1979)

(criticizing the

Ohralik decision for failing to provide principled guidance); Note, Yes, FTC, There Is a
Virginia: The Impact of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. On The FTC's Regulation of Misleading Advertising, 57 B.U.L. REv. 833, 862

(1977) (suggesting that commercial speech deserves the same protection as noncommercial
speech under the first amendment).
See also Note, The Commercial Speech Doctrine and the First Amendment, 12 TULSA L.J.
699 (1977); Note, First Amendment Protections for Commercial Advertising: The New ConstitutionalDoctrine,44 U. Cm. L. REv. 205 (1976); Comment, Regulating Commercial Speech:
A Conceptual Frameworkfor Analysis, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 235 (1980).

6. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
7. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
8. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). See also In re R.M.J., 50 U.S.L.W. 4185 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1982).
9. See generally Welch, Bates, Ohralik, Primus- The First Amendment Challenge to
State Regulation of Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, 30 BAYLOR L. RFV. 585 (1978).

10. Some courts and commentators have said that these cases provide clear guidance to
attorney solicitation matters. See, e.g., Pace v. State, 368 So. 2d 340, 345 (Fla. 1979) (Primus
and Ohralik "clearly draw the line"); Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participationin
Regulation of the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REv. 619, 620 n.9 (1978) ("The Supreme

Court has drawn the line... at person-to-person solicitation"). Other courts and commenta-
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In the few years since the initial decisions in this area, lower courts have addressed several of the unresolved issues, but not without predictable inconsistencies. 11
The split of judicial opinion on these issues reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the recent Supreme Court pronouncements. This note will
suggest that the proper constitutional interpretation of Bates, Ohralik and
Primus requires protection for many forms of solicitation now prohibited. In
addition, this note will conclude that protection is mandated unless there is a
clear, foreseeable potential for such substantive evils as fraud, deception,
harassment or overreaching. Regulation should be permissible only when
potential dangers are clearly evident. Otherwise, regulation must be limited to
situations where the potential for
proscribing actual misconduct in solicitation
12
danger is either nonexistent or speculative.
BACKGROUND

Of the three critical cases in the area, only Ohralik and Primus involved
solicitation. Bates involved attorney advertising, but a discussion of the case is
essential because its principles are strongly analogous to the solicitation issue."3
The Bates decision reversed a traditional total proscription of advertising legal
tors, however, have recognized that the cases leave many questions unresolved. See, e.g.,
Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80, 85 (C.D. Calif. 1980); Reich, supra note 5, at 779; Comment,
Attorney Advertising and Solicitation- In the Wake of Bates, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 166, 182
(1978). Cf. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1979) (declaring that permissible scope of
commercial speech regulations is "unchartered," citing Ohralik).
11. E.g., compare Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978) (direct mail
solicitation is protected) with Allison v. Louisiana St. Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978)
(direct mail solicitation is not protected). See also In re Teichner, 75 Ill. 2d 88, 387 N.E.2d
265 (1979) (certain types of in-person solicitation allowed); In re Jaques, 407 Mich. 26, 281
N.W.2d 469 (1979) (solicitation through union agent protected); Adler, Barish, Daniels,
Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 2817 (1979) (former associates enjoined from communicating with former
clients in person, by telephone or through mail).
12. This note is not intended to be an analysis of the propriety of granting first amendment protection to commercial speech as compared with the traditional protection afforded
noncommercial speech. Rather, this Note proceeds on the basis that the United States Supreme
Court has properly recognized commercial speech as deserving first amendment protection.
See note 5 supra. Cf. Gellhorn, The Right to Know: First Amendment Overbreadth?, 1976
WASH. U.L.Q. 25, 28 (1976) (arguing that the first amendment is being overworked in cases
involving claims of a public right to know). Additionally, this Note is not intended to be a
statement on the ethical issues regarding attorney solicitation. This Note is concerned only
with the constitutional issues because their resolution will determine how bar associations
can approach the ethical issues. See generally Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 1981 Fla. L.W. 613,
615 (Fla. Oct. 23, 1981) (Overton, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (observing the
ethical-constitutional distinction).
13. The word "solicitation" is sometimes confused with tie word "advertising." These
words are similar in that all advertising involves an element of solicitation, but all solicitation
does not involve advertising. Put simply, advertising generally refers to a communication directed to the public at large, usually by way of an impersonal medium such as a newspaper.
Solicitation generally refers to a communication directed at a specific individual by a specific
individual. See generally BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 74, 1564 (rev. ed. 1968).
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services.' 4 That long standing tradition did not die easily, however. In a 5-4
decision, the Court held that the first amendment's freedom of speech clause
protected attorney advertising of the prices of certain routine legal services in
newspapers.' 5 The Court reasoned that society's interest in the free flow of
truthful commercial information was greater than the state's interest in forbidding such advertising.,- Moreover, the Court rejected several factors that
the state had offered as justifications for the ban. The state had argued that
advertising would: undermine true professionalism; be inherently misleading;
have the undesirable effect of stirring up litigation; result in higher prices to
clients because lawyers' costs would rise; result in lower quality of service; and
create undue enforcement problems. 7
The same justifications proposed in Bates were again before the Court in
the Ohralik solicitation case. In Ohralik, an Ohio attorney learned of an auto
accident involving a young woman with whom he was casually acquainted. The
attorney promptly contacted the victim's parents, then personally visited the
victim while she lay in traction in the hospital. He later personally visited another victim at her home. His solicitation efforts resulted in one written and
14. H. DRINKE, LEGAL ETHIcs 5, 210-11 (1953). But see Jacksonville Bar Ass'n v. Wilson,
102 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1958) (local bar allowed to advertise a lawyer referral service in which all
attorneys were eligible).
15. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 384. Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion,
joined by justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist dissented from the first amendment holding.
All nine justices agreed that the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act were inapplicable
because state rules governing the conduct of lawyers were covered by the state action exemption of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 433 U.S. at 359. But cf. National Soc'y of Prof'l
Engrs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (ethical ban on competitive bidding by engineers
violated Sherman Act); Goldfarb v. Virginia St. Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee
schedule by a county bar association violated Sherman Act). See generally Francis & Johnson,
The Emperor's Old Clothes: Piercing the Bar's Ethical Veil, 13 WILLAmETr L.J. 221, 247
(1977) (big law firms are a "monopoly within a monopoly"); Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 CoLo.
L. Ray. 1363, 1367 (1978) (expressing fear that applying antitrust rules to legal profession
could open door to ambulance chasing); Huber, Competition at the Bar and the Proposed
Code of Professional Standards, 57 N.C.L. Rlv. 559, 573-77 (1979) (discussing application of
antitrust decisions to attorney solicitation); Rigler, Professional Codes of Conduct After Goldfarb: A Proposed Method of Antitrust Analysis, 29 ARK. L. Rav. 185, 197 (1975) (claiming
that antitrust laws should apply to lawyer solicitation); Justice Department Dismisses Antitrust Suit Against ABA, 64 A.B.A.J. 1538 (1978) (discusses antitrust lawsuit in which Justice
Department claimed that lawyer antisolicitation rules violate Sherman Act); Why Did the
Antitrust Division Dismiss the Case?, 64 A.B.A.J. 1667 (1978) (supporting view that lawyer
antisolicitation rules do not violate Sherman Act). See also Matter of Am. Medical Ass'n, 94
F.T.C. 701 (1979) (order by the Federal Trade Commission holding that the American
Medical Association, and others, had unlawfully restricted the advertising and solicitation
practices of doctors); Benham & Benham, Regulating Through the Professions: A Perspective
on Information Control, 18 J.L. & ECON. 421 (1975) (analyzing economic effect of ethical bans
on solicitation and advertising in the profession of optometry).
16. 433 U.S. at 384. See Comment, Commercial Speech: Foreclosing on the Overbreadth
Doctrine, 30 U. FLA. L. REv. 479 (1978) (case comment analyzing Bates). Cf. Durham v. Brock,
498 F. Supp. 213, 214 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (granting first amendment protection to advertisement of routine legal service without a statement of price).
17. 433 U.S. at 368-79. Cf. Lawyer Ads with Religious Theme Draw Fire, 67 A.B.A.J. 420
(April, 1981) (discussing ad found to be actually misleading).
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one oral contingent-fee employment agreement. 8 The Ohralik Court did not
reverse the traditional ban on legal solicitation as it had done with advertising.
Instead, the Court held that states do not offend the first amendment by forbidding in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely
to pose dangers that the state has a right to prevent. 19
In the companion case, Primus, the Court carved out an exception to its
approval of the traditional solicitation ban. The attorney in Primus, in cooperation with the non-profit American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), wrote
a letter to a woman offering free legal assistance regarding a civil rights matter.
The South Carolina attorney had earlier advised a group of women, including
the one solicited, of their legal rights at a meeting arranged by another nonprofit organization.20 When presented with the solicatation issue, the Court
held that solicitation of clients by mail is protected by the first amendment if
done by an attorney working for a non-profit organization which engages in
litigation as a form of political expression and association.21
In these last two cases, the Court emphasized that the solicitation in
Ohralik involved commercial speech 2 while the solicitation in Primus involved
political speech.2 3 Commercial speech, the Ohralik Court stated, is entitled to
only a limited measure of first amendment protection because of its subordinate
position to non-commercial speech. 24 This frequently-cited dictum recognized
clearly the existence of a hierarchy of values among first amendment speech
rights. In addition, the Court removed all doubt that the "common sense"
acknowledged in
distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech
28
2
well.
as
distinction
legal
a
now
was
5
opinion
a previous
Recognizing a distinction between the solicitation in Ohralik and Primus
was easy for the Court. The difference in the lawyers' conduct in the two cases
18. 436 U.S. at 449-52. This second victim had just been released from the hospital following nearly two weeks of care. Id. at 469.
19. Id. at 449.
20. 436 U.S. at 414-17.
21. Id. at 449.
22. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455.
23. Primus,436 U.S. at 431.
24. Id. at 456. But see Note, .upra note 5, at 862 (suggesting there should be no distinction). Both the Supreme Court and lower courts have cited this commercial-noncommercial
distinction to justify numerous types of commercial regulations. See, e.g., Friedman v. Rogers,
9
440 U.S. 1, 11 n. (1979) (approving ban on use of trade names by optometrists); American
Future Sys., Inc. v. Pennsylvania St. Univ., 618 F.2d 252, 258 (3d Cir. 1980) (approving ban on
commercial solicitation in college residence halls); Olitsky v. O'Malley, 597 F.2d 295, 301 (Ist

Cir. 1979) (approving ban on solicitation of drinks by entertainers in nightclub); Jay Norris,
Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 598 F.2d 1244, 1252 (2d Cir. 1979) (allowing F.T.C. to regulate
mail order business); Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 489 F. Supp. 763, 770 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (approving ban on liquor advertising).
25. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)
(state ban on advertising by pharmacists violated first amendment). Compare Semler v. Oregon
St. Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935) (state law precluding dentists from advertising upheld on due process grounds) with Stadnik v. Shell's City, Inc., 140 So. 2d 871 (Fla.
1962) (state law precluding pharmacists from advertising struck down on due process grounds).
26. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2892 (1981) (referring to
the distinction as a legal one).
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was so extreme that perhaps the Court's job was too simple. More clearly defined standards would possibly have resulted had the factual situations in the
two cases not been so different. Justice Marshall, concurring in both cases,
correctly noted that the situations represented opposite poles in the attorney
solicitation issue.27 Ohralik involved an example of so-called "ambulance
chasing".28 The attorney in that case promptly contacted a victim's parents and
visited one victim at a hospital and another at home.- In almost total contrast
to the aggressive manner of solicitation in Ohralik, the attorney in Primus
merely contacted a woman by letter on behalf of the ACLU.30 Both attorneys
had clearly violated the literal provisions of two disciplinary rules, one rule
prohibiting the self-reconmnendation of employment and the other rule prohibiting employment following unsolicited advice.3l As applied to Mr. Ohralik,
the two rules were constitutional. His commercial speech, although admittedly
truthful, was undeserving of constitutional protection because it occurred in a
3 2
situation which involved a clear potential for overreaching and deception.
The two rules as applied to Ms. Primus, however, were unconstitutional because her speech involved the more traditional first amendment aspects of
political expression and association.33
The commercial-noncommercial distinction is of great importance in ana27. 436 U.S. at 471.
28. Id. The term "ambulance chasing" refers to a method of obtaining accident victims
as clients. In its most literal sense, it refers to a practice where an attorney, or an attorney's
agent, follows an ambulance to the scene of an accident or to a hospital with the hope of
convincing an accident victim or a survivor to hire the attorney to represent the victim or
survivor in a personal injury lawsuit or wrongful death action. The term is more broadly
used to refer to any solicitation of accident victims or survivors. See generally Huber,
Ambulance Chasing, Hous. Lw., Sept. 1976, at 10; Saden, Inquiry Into Ambulance Chasing,
30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 182 (1955). See also M. FREEDMAN, LAWYmEs' Erics IN AN ADvERSARY SysrEm
113-25 (1975) (suggesting that ambulance chasing is sometimes justified to protect victims
from waiving legal rights); C6rmment, Ambulance Chasing in Illinois, A Success Story, 1957
U. ILL.L.F. 809 (1957).
29. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
30. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
81. The two Ohio disciplinary rules violated by Mr. Ohralik were similar to the ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL R.SONSmarry DR 2-103(a), DR 2-104(A)(1). 436 U.S. at 453 n.9. See note 1
supra. The two South Carolina disciplinary rules violated by Ms. Primus were slightly different
from the Model Code rules. 436 U.S. at 418-20, n.10-11. South Carolina's version of DR 2-104(A)
prohibited employment resulting from any unsolicited advice, not just "in-person unsolicited
advice" as in the Model Code. CODE OF LAws OF S.C. §56-145 (1962). South Carolina's version
of DR 2-108(D)(5)(a) prohibited a lawyer from cooperating with a non-profit orgainization
whose primary purpose included the rendition of legal services. CODE OF LAws OF S.C. §56-142
(1962). The South Carolina supreme court determined that the ACLU's primary purpose was
to engage in litigation. In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 264, 288 S.E.2d 801, 806 (1977), rev'd, 486

U.S. 412 (1978).
82. 486 U.S. at 468. The potential for overreaching and deception is said to be due to the
vulnerability of an accident victim, especially when confronted by a persuasive lawyer. Id.
at 465. In Ohralik, there was additionally an element of actual deception in that Mr. Ohralik
secretly recorded the conversations he had with one of the victims and with the other victim's
parents. Id. at 450-51; id. at 469 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
88. 486 U.S. at 489.
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lyzing the constitutionality of anti-solicitation rules. Nevertheless, circumstances
surrounding particular solicitations require thorough first amendment analysis, 3 4 even when such solicitations can be classified clearly as commercial or
non-commercial. 35 In Ohralik, the Court never stated that all solicitation involving a profit motive could be constitutionally prohibited. In fact, the key
language of its holding was that such solicitation could be prohibited only
"under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the state has a right to prevent.'36 Similarly, the Primus decision never condoned all solicitation connected with political expression. The Court stated clearly that carefully-tailored
solicitation rules could be enforced against attorneys working for non-profit
87
political groups.
Read narrowly, the Ohralik decision allows the total prohibition of inperson solicitation of accident victims at the hospital and at their homes
shortly after the mishap. 38 The Court, however, failed to clarify whether the
prohibition of all in-person solicitation of accident victims is allowed, whether
in-person solicitation of other types of clients is protected, and whether protection will be accorded telephone solicitation, direct mail solicitation, and
specifically directed advertisements. The literal terms of most state ethics codes
prohibit all of these types of solicitation, with limited exceptions concerning
solicitations directed at relatives, close friends, former clients and present
clients.89
Another troubling question which remains from Primus is the import of
the Court's emphasis that the actual solicitation in that case was done by letter
rather than by person. 40 The Court noted that solicitation by letter provided
the prospective client with adequate time to consider the offer, with little
chance of coercion. 4 1 The question remains, therefore, whether the decision
would have been different had Ms. Primus made the offer of legal assistance
2
in person or on the telephone.4
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SINCE

Ohralik AND Primus
The Ohralik statement that the Constitution provides little protection to
commercial speech was reaffirmed in Friedman v. Rogers.43 In Friedman, a
34. The Court in Ohralik stated that an independent review of the attorney's particular
conduct was required. 436 U.S. at 463.
35. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 2908 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (stating that the distinction often is anything but clear).
36. 436 U.S. at 449. Justice Marshall, concurring, stated that the Ohralik holding was
limited to allowing regulations "under circumstances . . . presenting substantial dangers of
harm." Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
37. 436 U.S. at 438-39.
38. 436 U.S. at 470 (Marshall, J., concurring); Reich, supra note 5, at 789. See also Adler
v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 428, 395 A.2d 1175, 1187 (1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting) (interpreting Ohralik narrowly).
39. See note I supra.
40. 436 U.S. at 422, 432, 435-36.
41. Id. at 435.
42. See text accompanying notes 133-148 infra.

43. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
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regulation banning the use of trade names by optometrists was upheld against
a first amendment attack. The Court ruled that a trade name was commercial
speech and therefore could be banned if it enhanced the possibility of deception. 44 The Court, however, did not address whether a mere speculation of
45
danger would be sufficient to uphold rules abridging commercial speech.
Nevertheless, both Friedman4 6 and Ohralik4 7 arguably implied that states
should be given broad powers to enforce prophylactic rules in commercial
S
speech areas other than informational advertising.4
This implication, however, proved erroneous in Central Hudson Gas v.
Public Service Commission49 which appeared to considerably strengthen commercial speech protection. Although Central Hudson dealt with promotional

advertising by a utility company, 50 the Supreme Court developed a test to be
applied to all types of commercial speech. 5' The test listed four questions that
must be addressed in all commercial speech cases: is the expression protected
by the first amendment?; 5 2 is the state interest substantial?; does the regulation
directly advance the government interest?; and is the regulation more extensive
than is necessary to serve that state interest?5 3

The critical portion of the test is the part requiring narrowly-drawn rules
for commercial speech.54 This requirement imposes a burden on states that did
44. Id. at 14-16. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented on the ground
that the regulation was too sveeping because it could result in a ban on "wholly truthful
speech." Id. at 24.
45. Comment, First Amendment Protection for Commercial Speech: An Optical Illusion?,
31 U. FiA. L. REv. 799,809 (1979).
46. 440 U.S. at 13-16.
47. 486 U.S. at 464-65.
48. See Note, Rewriting Commercial Speech and Due Process Analysis: The Standard for
Deceptiveness in Friedman v. Rogers, 57 TEx. L. REv. 1456, 1484 (1979); Comment, Trade
Names are not a Protected Form of Commercial Speech, 11 TEx. TErn L. Ray. 717, 727 (1980);
Comment, Narrowing the Scope of FirstAmendment Protection for Commercial Expression, 13
SurFoLK U.L. REv. 1508, 1523 (1979).
49. 100 S. Ct. 2843 (1980).
50. The Court held that a regulation banning all promotional advertising by the utility
was more extensive than necessary, and therefore violated the first and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 2354.
51. The Court defined "commercial speech" as "expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience." Id. at 2349.
52. The Court clarified this by stating the expression "at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading." Id. at 2551.
53. Id.
54. At least two courts prior to Central Hudson imposed a least restrictive means test
in a commercial speech case. Durham v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 218, 224-25 (M.D. Tenn. 1980)
(striking a ban on advertising routine legal services without price); Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh,
355 So. 2d 1186, 1192-98 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam) (case involving laymen who advertised
typing services for do-it-yourself legal forms). But see Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 481 Pa.
Super. Ct. 6, 10, 391 A.2d 1066, 1070 (1978) (refusing to use least restrictive means analysis
in commercial speech case). See also Coca-Cola Co. v. State of Florida, Dept. of Citrus, No. 57,
108, slip op. at 15 (Fla., filed June 4, 1981) (upholding commercial speech regulation using
least restrictive means analysis); Commonwealth v. Sterlace, 481 Pa. Super. Ct. 6, 12, 391 A.2d
1066, 1072 (1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting) (arguing that advertising regulation should be
struck using least restrictive means analysis); Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by
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not seem to exist under the Ohralik and Friedman decisionsY5 The Central
Hudson Court cited both of those cases for the proposition that government
may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to
inform it.56 Further, the Court confusingly cited Primus, a noncommercial
speech case, to support its new position that commercial speech regulations
must be narrowly drawn.57
Despite the insistence on narrowly-drawn rules, the Central Hudson Court
reiterated its reluctance to apply the overbreadth doctrine to the commercial
speech area. 58 In other words, the Court stated that although governmental
rules should be no broader than necessary, overbroad rules can only be challenged by persons who have engaged in protected speech. Thus, the Central
Hudson approach suggests that an overbroad regulation will be given full effect

until a party can demonstrate it has actually been applied to protected speech.
Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 4 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 183, 194 (1976) (suggesting that advertising and solicitation rules should be no
broader than necessary); Reich, supra note 5, at 789 (questioning why Ohralik did not address
the least-restrictive-means issue).
55. See Fein, Free Speech in Ads Wins Key Plug from Brethren, NAt'L L.J., Nov. 17,
1980, at 15. Justice Rehnquist dissented in Central Hudson, claiming that the least restrictive
means portion of the test elevated commercial speech to a level "virtually indistinguishable"
from noncommercial speech. He complained that the Court was ignoring the Ohralik proclamation that a significant legal distinction did exist. 100 S. Ct. at 2364 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist made a similar argument in his Primus dissent in claiming that a
distinction would often be too difficult to determine. 436 U.S. at 443 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Despite Justice Rehnquist's assertion, the primary distinction is still clear: states may
regulate against potential harm in the commercial speech area but only against actual harm
in the noncommercial speech field. In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 434. The Central Hudson test,
therefore, simply prohibits broad prophylactic rules, which is not inconsistent with first
amendment theory. See Village of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637
(1980) (charitable solicitation ban too extensive); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968) (outlining a three-part test for government regulations under first amendment, including requirement of least restrictive means); Hellman, The Oklahoma Supreme Court's New
Rules on Lawyer Advertising: Some Practical,Legal, and Policy Questions, 31 OKLA. L. REv.
509, 547 (1978) (suggesting least restrictive means test for content regulations under first
amendment).
56. 100 S. Ct. at 2350.
57. Id. at 2350-51. The Missouri supreme court, when urged to follow the Central
Hudson test in an attorney solicitation case, responded by stating: "We respectfully decline
to enter the thicket of attempting to anticipate and to satisfy the subjective ad hoc judgments
of a majority of the justices of the United States Supreme Court." In re R.M.J., 609 S.W.2d
411, 412 (Mo. 1980) (en banc), rev'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4185 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1982). A dissenting judge
in In re R.M.J. stated that Central Hudson was not entirely applicable to lawyer solicitation,
but he gave no reasons for the statement. Id. at 414 (Bardgett, C.J., dissenting). Cf. Florida
Bar v. Schreiber, 1981 Fla. L.W. 613 (Fla. Oct. 23, 1981) (also finding Central Hudson not
entirely applicable based on its particular facts).
58. 100 S. Ct. at 2351 n.8. The first amendment overbreadth doctrine is a departure from
the traditional rule that a person may not challenge a regulation on the ground that it might
be applied unconstitutionally in circumstances other than those before the court. Under the
doctrine, a person whose conduct may be unprotected can have a rule or law struck on the
ground that the rule or law may be applied in cases where the conduct would be protected.
See generally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970);
Comment, supra note 16.
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This "as applied" analysis was derived from the Bates advertising decision,5 9
where the Court declared that the overbreadth doctrine applied "weakly, if
at all," in commercial speech cases. 60 The Bates Court admitted that over-

breadth analysis is appropriate in noncommercial speech cases because broad
rules tend to chill protected speech.61 The majority, however, noted that com-

mercial speech is not particularly susceptible to being "crushed" by overbroad
2
regulation because such speech is linked to economic well-being.
Unfortunately, the Court has not reevaluated the CentralHudson and Bates

reasoning in the context of solicitation. There are both similarities and differences between advertising and solicitation, but a significant disparity exists
between the extent of first amendment protecton accorded the two manners of
speech. On one hand, the scope of the protection given advertising in Bates
was based on the sharply-defined standard of truthfulness.63 On the other hand,
Ohralik illustrated that the extent of protection accorded solicitation was unclear, since even truthful solicitation can be prohibited. 64 Therefore, an overbroad regulation might not deter protected advertising under Bates' standard

of truthfulness, while an overbroad regulation would likely deter solicitation
deserving protection because of Ohralik's failure to delineate clearly which
truthful solicitations are protected. Despite this critical distinction, the Court
in Ohralik lightly cast aside any overbreadth argument by merely citing Bates.65
Moreover, subsequent lower courts have cited Bates for the proposition that an
overbreadth challenge can never be asserted against commercial speech regulations, thus interpreting the words "weakly, if at all" to mean totally inapplicable.6
The Supreme Court's rationale for rejecting the overbreadth doctrine is
suspect in commercial contexts where broad rules may chill the exercise of first
amendment rights.6 7 As long as the Supreme Court believes commercial speech
59. 433 U.S. 350, 380.
60. Id.
61. Id.

62. Id. at 381. The use of the word "crushed" seems inappropriate. The proper test is
whether the regulation will have a "chilling" effect, not a "crushing" one. Id. at 380.
63. 433 U.S. at 381. The Court essentially stated that all truthful advertising is protected,
therefore broad rules would not have a "crushing" effect because the advertiser is in the best
position to determine the truthfulness of his advertisement. Id.
64. 436 U.S. at 464 (no actual harm need be shown).
65. 436 U.S. at462 n.20.
66. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 S. Ct. 2882, 2890 n.11 (1981);
Olitsky v. O'Malley, 597 F.2d 295, 303 (1st Cir. 1979); Space Age Products, Inc. v. Gilliam, 488
F. Supp. 775, 785 n.7 (D. Del. 1980); Koffier v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 143, 412 N.E.2d
927, 930 (1980); People v. Mobil Oil Corp., 48 N.Y.2d 192, 195, 397 N.E.2d 724, 727 (1979).
Confusion in this area is certain to continue as a result of a recent decision granting first
amendment protection to nude dancing. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 101 S. Ct. 1276
(1981). In Schad, an ordinance which prohibited commercial entertainment was struck as
overbroad on first amendment grounds. Id. at 2186-87. In dissent Chief Justice Burger argued
that an "as applied" analysis should have been used, id. at 4604, which would seem to be more
consistent with the Court's previous opinions on the overbreadth issue. Cf. Village of Schaum.
berg v. Citizens For a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (charitable solicitation ordinance
overbroad, but not dealt with as a variety of purely commercial speech).
67. See People v. Posner, 79 Mich. App. 63, 68, 261 N.W.2d 209, 214 '(1977) (statute
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deserves first amendment protection, it should remain consistent and guard
against the chilling effect of overbroad regulations. Under most current codes"8
and some state statutes, 69 almost all types of attorney solicitation are prohibited.
As a result, lawyers who wish to solicit must familiarize themselves with the
case law in the area and then guess whether their planned solicitation is constitutionally protected. Many lawyers undoubtedly have resigned themselves
to maintaining the status quo until the broad rules are changed, or to waiting
until some other lawyer challenges the rules. Forcing lawyers to risk disciplinary action by the bar 7° or criminal action by the state-1 has an undeniable
chilling effect on commercial speech. To remedy this chilling effect, courts
should strike the broad rules in their entirety and force the bar and states to
draft narrowly tailored regulations.72
The proper treatment of overbroad regulations is certain to remain the subject of debate as a result of the recent, widely-divided Supreme Court decision
in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.7 3 At issue in that case was the constitutionality of a broad ban against commercial and noncommercial billboard
advertising. Only a four-man plurality could agree on the first amendment
principles applicable to the case.7 4 The plurality declared the billboard ban
unconstitutional as it related to noncommercial speech,7 5 but constitutional as
it related to commercial speech.76 Although the plurality stated that the
ordinance complied with the Central Hudson commercial speech requirements, 7 7 a two-man concurrence used those same requirements to justify strik-

ing the ordinance.7 8 On the commercial speech issue alone, the plurality and
three dissenting justices-M were in apparent agreement that there was no first
amendment violation.
banning solicitation of accident victims by attorneys struck as being overbroad). But see Woll
v. Kelley, 409 Mich. 500, 518, 297 N.W.2d 578, 596 (1980) (same statute construed to ban only
Ohralik-type solicitations). See also Metpath, Inc. v. Myers, 462 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (advertising ban imposed against clinical laboratories struck as being overbroad);
Carricarte v. State, 384 So. 2d 1261, 1262 (Fla. 1980) (overbreadth challenge considered in
attorney solicitation case).
68. See note I supra.
69. See, e.g.. FLA. STAT. §877.02 (1979).
70. See, e.g., Matter of Carroll, 124 Ariz. 80, 602 P.2d 461 (1979) (one-year suspension);
Kitsis v. State Bar, 592 P.2d 323, 153 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1979) (disbarment); In re Teichner, 75
Ill. 2d 88, 387 N.E.2d 265 (1979) (two-year suspension); Matter of Jaques, 407 Mich. 26, 281
N.W.2d 469 (1979) (two-year suspension vacated).
71. See, e.g., In re Arnoff, 586 P.2d 960, 150 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1978) (attorney guilty of
violating statute forbidding use of agents to solicit accident victims); Pace v. State, 368 So. 2d
340 (Fla. 1979) (attorney convicted of misdemeanor for violating broad antisolicitation statute).
72. See text accompanying notes 217-248 infra.
73. 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
74. The plurality opinion was written by Justice White, joined by Justices Stewart,
Marshall and Powell. See The Final Days, TIMiE, July 13, 1981, at 52 (referring to the opinion
as "perhaps the most confusing decision of the term").

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

101 S. Ct. at 2891.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2891 n.12.
Id. at 2891 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2924 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at

2909 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Although the justices in Metromedia differed sharply on the first amendment analysis appropriate for billboard advertising, not one justice disagreed
with the principle that different methods of commercial communication may
likely result in different treatment under the first amendment. ° That caveat
indicates that analogies should be cautiously drawn between factual situations
like Metromedia and attorney solicitation cases. As the Supreme Court stated,
each method of communication presents unique problems which may, in turn,
require unique analysis. 8 ' Accordingly, uncertainty will continue to exist until
the Court directly addresses the many unresolved issues in the attorney solicitation area. 2 In dealing with these issues, the Court should be particularly
cognizant of the distinctions between the following types of attorney conduct:
in-person solicitation for profit; in-person solicitation involving non-commercial
speech; telephone and direct mail solicitation for profit; and solicitation for
profit through the media.
IN-PERSON SOLICITATION FOR PROFIT

Many factors have been offered to justify a total ban on in-person solicitation for profit, including the potential for fraud, deception, coercion, harasssment, misrepresentation, and overreaching.8 3 All of these factors stem from the
80. Id. at 2900; id. at 2917 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
81. Id. at 2889 n.8.
82. The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to clarify some of the first amendment issues in the attorney solicitation area in Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 101 S. Ct. 2193 (1981).
Nevertheless, the Court ignored the first amendment issue and ruled that the trial judge had
abused his discretion in prohibiting attorneys from soliciting potential class members in a
race discrimination class action. Id. at 2201. Even if the first amendment issues had been
addressed, the decision would likely have had only a limited effect because the solicitation
occurred after the attorney already had an initial client, and the class action involved noncommercial speech, which already is entitled to a high degree of first amendment protection
under Primus. The Primus case had been relied on by the lower court in holding the trial
judge's order unconstitutional. Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 477-78 (5th Cir. 1980).
See also Zarate v. Younglove, 86 F.R.D. 80 (C.D. Calif. 1980) (attorney allowed to solicit class
members in a discrimination case); Great W. Cities, Inc. v. Binstein, 476 F. Supp. 827 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (association of landowners allowed to solicit class members in land fraud case);
Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 109 (D.S.C. 1978) (attorney who stood to gain
financially prohibited from writing letters to potential class members in a discrimination case);
Waldo v. Lakeshore Estates Inc., 433 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. La. 1977) (solicitation ban in class
action upheld).
83. 436 U.S. at 461. See Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1184 (1972); Comment, A Critical Analysis of
Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 674, 675 (1958).
Another factor used by states to justify total bans on in-person solicitation is the problem
of enforcing regulations in the area. This justification was rejected in Bates as it related to
advertising with a stinging comment that it is incongruous for lawyers to extol the virtues of
their profession in one breath and then claim in the next breath that relaxed rules will lead
many to pursue unethical goals. 433 U.S. at 379. Although in-person solicitation creates
special enforcement problems, due primarily to the absence of a transcript of the communications, the burden of enforcement would not seem to justify completely shutting off the benefits of allowing the free flow of truthful information. The burden should be on the bar and
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fear that some lawyers will solicit in bad faith and attempt to take advantage
of unwitting prospective clients. In-person solicitation undeniably poses the
problem of persuasive lawyers causing laymen to enter into agreements that
they otherwise would not enter. A ban on all in-person solicitation for profit
is not justified, however, solely because a certain percentage of lawyers can be
expected to act in bad faith. The better approach, and the approach consistent
with Ohralik, would be to forbid in-person solicitation for profit in situations
where prospective clients would be particularly susceptible to "bad faith"
lawyers.8 4 For example, a state could justifiably determine that a person would
be particularly susceptible to attorney influence at the scene of an accident, in
a hospital, while on medication, just prior to a court appearance, while in jail,
or at a funeral home.8 5 In these situations, the physical injuries or the emotional
trauma of the prospective client might render the person incapable of making
88
a rational decision.
The Ohralik Court also expressed concern that personal solicitation potentially presents a "special problem" of conflict of interest between the client's
legal cause and the lawyer's desire for remuneration.17 This concern, however,
is present in the context of any legal case, regardless of how the attorney obtained the employment. Whether the client or the attorney initiated the contact, the chance of a financial element unduly swaying the attorney's course of

the states to prove that enforcement is too formidable a task before first amendment rights are
infringed.
84. See, e.g., 436 U.S. at 454 ("in-person communication with a prospective client has
long been viewed ... as posing a significant potential for harm ....").The Court's refusal
to approve a blanket ban on commercial in-person solicitation justifies Justice Marshall's
assertion that the holding is a limited one. Id. at 470. Accord, Note, Attorney Solicitation:
The Scope of State Regulation After Primus and Ohralik, 12 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 144, 164 &
n.13 (1978) (in-person solicitation should not be punishable per se). It also has been argued
that the tort laws against fraud and against misrepresentation could be sufficient in themselves to regulate attorney solicitation. B. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE
MEANS 141 (1970); Comment, supra note 10, at 180.
85. See, e.g., Matter of Carroll, 124 Ariz. 80, 602 P.2d 461 (1979) (one-year suspension for
soliciting accident victims soon after an explosion); Kitsis v. State Bar, 23 Cal. 3d 857, 592
P.2d 323, 153 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1979) (attorney disbarred after hiring three laypersons to
solicit at accident sites, hospitals, and auto shops); In re Perrello, 260 Ind. 254, 295 N.E.2d
357 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973) (two-year suspension for numerous instances of
soliciting business in corridor of courthouse); Louisiana St. Bar Ass'n v. Rutledge, 264 La. 11,
270 So. 2d 535 (1972) (attorney reprimanded for handing out a business card in a hospital).
See also In re Smith, 5 B.R. 92 (Bankruptcy Ct. 1980) (overreaching in bankruptcy law where
persons solicited were deeply in debt); In re Arnoff, 22 Cal. 3d 740, 586 P.2d 960, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 479 (1978) (two-year suspension for soliciting accident victims); Goldman v. State Bar,
20 Cal. 3d 130, 570 P.2d 463, 141 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1977) (one-year suspension for soliciting
accident victims); Florida Bar v. Abramson, 199 So. 2d 457 (Fla. 1967) (public reprimand for
soliciting accident victims at hospital); Ex Parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Crim. 1980)
(client solicited in jail received new trial on sixth amendment ground that attorney provided
ineffective assistance of counsel); Note, supra note 84, at 173.
86. Cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (time, place and manner restrictions on commercial speech are permitted).
87. 436 U.S. at 461, 461 n.19.
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action always exists. Solicitation neither adds nor detracts from this general
problem.
A special problem exists, however, regarding the legitimate state interest in
protecting the privacy of persons whom an attorney may want to solicit81 Inperson solicitation represents an intrusion on a person's privacy to an extent
quite different from other types of personal solicitation such as by telephone
or direct mail. The Court in Ohralik declined to evaluate the privacy interests
affected by in-person solicitation,89 but privacy interests alone would probably
not be compelling enough to sustain a blanket prohibition of in-person solicitation. This would be particularly true in situations where in-person solicitation
by persons other than attorneys is routinely permitted. For example, if salesmen may solicit in particular business districts or residential neighborhoods,
then the solicited person's privacy interest would not by itself justify 'prohibiting attorneys from soliciting in these areas. 90 Likewise, if insurance claims adjusters are allowed to solicit settlement agreements with accident victims, then
privacy interests alone should not bar attorneys from approaching the victim.91
Because in-person solicitation is but one manner of solicitation, states may
be justified in proscribing it where ample alternative channels are left open
for communication of the information.12 Reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions on speech have often been approved by the Supreme Court,93 but
complete suppression of a mode of communication does not qualify as a time,
place or manner restriction." 4 Although it has been argued that advertising
provides a sufficient alternative to solicitation, this argument has been rejected
88. Id. The Supreme Court has recognized a right of privacy. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). See Note, The ConstitutionalRight of Privacy:An Examination, 69 Nw. U.L. Rav.
263 (1974).

89. 436 U.S. at 462.
90. Compare Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1948) (ordinance affecting noncommercial
door-to-door solicitation unconstitutional) with Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)
(ordinance regulating commercial door-to-door solicitation constitutional). See Freedman, supra
note 54, at 195 (questioning whether Martin is still good law). See also Village of Schaumberg
v. Citizens For a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (ordinance prohibiting door-to-door and
on-street solicitation by charitable organization violated first amendment); Hynes v. Mayor of
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (ordinance requiring permit to solicit door to door for charitable
or political purpose unconstitutional); Holloway v. Brown, 62 Ohio St. 2d 65, 403 N.E.2d 191
(Sup. Ct. 1980) (narrowly-drawn solicitation ordinance upheld); Project: The Direct Selling
Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 883, 895-922 (1969).
91. In Ohralik, the Court recognized that solicitation by claims adjusters pose problems
similar to attorney solicitation. 436 U.S. at 459 n.16. See Larson v. Lesser, 106 So. 2d 188 (Fla.
1958) (statute prohibiting insurance adjusters from soliciting business struck as unconstitutional on due process grounds).
92. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
98. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 101 S. Ct. 2559
(1981) (state fair rule regarding solicitation held to be a permissable time, place and manner
restriction); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding antinoise regulations); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) (upholding licensing requirement for
parades).
94. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
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by at least one court in a case where the facts clearly showed that advertising
was an inadequate method of providing information to specific groups.95 Because solicitation enables an attorney to provide a greater amount of information to a prospective client, courts should be hesitant in holding that advertising provides a sufficient alternative.06
Solicitation of Accident Victims
Cases involving "ambulance chasing" 97 would seem to present the obvious
situation where a lawyer should be prohibited from in-person solicitation. An
accident victim is generally in no condition to evaluate a sales pitch. Nevertheless, the accident victim often needs a lawyer to protect potential legal rights.
If an accident victim has legal rights which should be exercised, the victim
should seek a lawyer. If the victim does not realize he has legal rights, solicitation would likely be an effective method of apprising the victim of information
he deserves to know.98 Consequently, even though accommodating the state's
interest in preventing coercion and the victim's interest in obtaining legal
assistance is a difficult task, blanket prohibitions against in-person solicitation
of accident victims are not warranted. The key would be to use the Ohralik
rationale by forbidding in-person solicitation of accident victims only "under
circustances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to prevent."' 9
The Illinois supreme court decision In re Teichner ° ° recognized a situation
where in-person solicitation of accident victims was protected by the first
amendment. The case involved a railroad disaster which injured several members of a black community. The minister of a local church contacted Mr.
Teichner, an attorney, and asked him to help the victims negotiate fair settlements. Although the victims never asked for the minister's help or for Mr.
Teichner's services, the attorney solicited the son of two victims at the son's
place of employment and the attorney solicited another victim at the victim's
home. As in Ohralik, both solicitations were conducted in-person and for
pecuniary gain, but on both occasions the attorneys were accompanied by a
church aide. This connection with the church prompted the court to state that
the solicitation was "tinged" with associational values similar to those present
in Primus. Relying on Primus, the court found the solicitations were protected
under the first amendment because there was no "clear and convincing evidence" of overreaching. 1' 1
95. Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 147, 412 N.E.2d 927, 934, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872,
878 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1733 (1981). Attorneys testified that newspaper advertisements were relatively ineffective whereas direct mail solicitation produced about 200
clients. Id.
96. CI. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 101 5. Ct. 2882 (1981) (striking broad billboard ban in part because billboard advertisers were left without ample alternatives).
97. See note 28 supra.
98. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 28. See also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 375-76
(rejecting the perceived problem of "stirring up litigation" in connection with advertising).
99. 436 U.S. at 449.
100. 75 Il1.2d 88, 387 N.E.2d 265 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979).
101. id. at 94-95, 105, 387 N.E.2d at 267-70, 272. The attorney was also charged with three
other instances of solicitation, one involving the use of an agent, another involving an emo-
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The Illinois court's reliance on Primusis tenuous because its "tinge test"1 0 2
is too easily subject to manipulation. Justice Rehnquist warned in his Primus
dissent that a test based on political association would lead to manipulation by
attorneys.103 Specifically, Justice Rehnquist expressed concern about lawyers
"cloaking" their true monetary motivation behind a claimed political association.104 Mr. Teichner, however, did not attempt to hide his true motivation,
which was providing legal assistance for profit. Rather, it was the minister of
the local church who cloaked the episode with an associational element, not
Mr. Teichner.10 5 This type of situation was not anticipated by Justice Rehnquist, but the concurring opinion in Teichner nevertheless accurately proclaimed that the "tinge test" could lead to unethical attorney conduct similar
to that envisioned by Justice Rehnquist. 0 6
To avoid manipulation, the key factor considered by courts should be the
attorney's primary motivation. Mr. Teichner's primary motivation was pecuniary gain; his interest in the church was incidental to his desire for employment.'0 7 Despite the presence of a Primus-type associational element, the Court
should have more consistently applied the principles of Ohralik to this case
because the commercial element dominates the noncommercial one. To come
within Primus, the attorney's possible monetary gain should be nonexistent 0 s
or merely incidental to the litigation's purpose. 10 9 Such an application would
be consistent with the Supreme Court's emphasis in Ohralik that a legal distinction exists between commercial and noncommercial speech."1o
If the situation in Teichner is evaluated in terms of Ohralik, an evaluation
of the potential dangers posed by the solicitation is necessary. Several factors
indicate that no danger was imminent. First, the minister initiated contact with
the attorney, and a church aide accompanied the attorney during the subsequent solicitation. Moreover, neither the minister nor the church aide had any
pecuniary interest in the litigation. Further, the church aide was concerned
primarily with protecting the welfare of the prospective clients. These factors
removed the potential danger necessary to warrant disciplinary action under
the principles of Ohralik."'

tionally upset victim and a third involving a group meeting arranged by an agent. None of

these solicitations was connected with the church-related solicitations. As a result, the attorney xeceived a three-year suspension. Id. at 94, 110-16, 387 N.E.2d at 266, 274-77.
102. Cf. McCune v. Wilson, 237 So. 2d 169, 173 (Fla. 1970) (holding that private organization, if "tinged" with public purpose, may not discipline member without due process).

103. 486 U.S. at 442.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
75 IM.2d at 104-05, 387 N.E.2d at 271.
Id. at 116-18, 387 N.E.2d at 277.
Id., 387 N.E.2d at 277.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 428-29.
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (case relied on heavily and followed in

Primus).

110. 436 U.S. at 456.
111. Justice Ryan, specially concurring in Teichner, agreed that the case was more aligned
with Ohralik than with Primus. He merely stated, however, that regulation was proper because
of Ohralik, without engaging in an analysis of the likelihood of harm. 75 Ill. 2d at 116-18,

387 N.E.2d at 277-78. Justice Ryan also admitted that Ohralik and Primus left many questions
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The Michigan supreme court in In re Jaques11" also approved in-person
solicitation of accident victims where the first attorney contact is with an intermediary aligned with the prospective client's interest. The attorney in Jaques
had initiated contact with the business agent of a union in an effort to represent
union members injured in a tunnel explosion. 1 13 The state court emphasized
that the Ohralik holding clearly indicated that blanket anti-solicitation rules
would violate the first amendment. 11 Consequently, the court stated that the
particular conduct of the attorney must be analyzed. 15 Since the union agent
acted as a buffer to alleviate potential overreaching or undue influence, the
court found no dangers in the facts presented which would prohibit solicitation.
Although no in-person solicitation of prospective clients actually occurred in
the case because the union agent refused to recommend the attorney,"" the
opinion clearly implied that in-person solicitation would have been allowed
if the agent had arranged personal meetings." 7
The union agent in Jaques and the minister in Teichner performed the
similar functions of shielding possible misconduct by the attorney. The Jaques
case goes one step further than Teichner, however, because the attorney in
Jaques initiated the contact with the intermediary, whereas the intermediary
brought about the encounter in Teichner. Although the results in Jaques and
Teichner were the same, the Jaques court applied sounder constitutional principles because the court based its decision on Ohralik rather than Primus. In
addition, there is little doubt that an extension of the Teichner "tinge test"
could have been used in Jaques because the associational activities were clearly
protected by the first amendment." 8 The straight-forward application of
unanswered, but he suggested that the United States Supreme Court, not lower courts, should
define the boundaries. Id. This suggestion is disturbing because it invites courts to uphold
blanket prohibitions in the commercial solicitation area, a result inconsistent with the
Ohralik holding. See notes 120-124 and accompanying text, infra. See generally Comment,
Expanding Protection for Attorney Solicitation, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 1189, 1197-1200 (1979)
(criticizing Teichner for its reliance on Primus rather than Ohralik).
112. 407 Mich. 26, 281 N.W.2d 469 (1979). This case was remanded by the United States
Supreme Court shortly after the Ohralik decision. Jaques v. State Bar Grievance Admin., 436
U.S. 952 (1978). In the original case, the Michigan supreme court imposed a two-year
suspension on the attorney. In re Jaques, 401 Mich. 516, 258 N.W.2d 443 (1977).
113. 407 Mich. at 38, 281 N.W.2d at 470.
114. Id. at 37, 281 N.W.2d at 470.
115. Id., 281 N.W.2d at 470.
116. Id. at 39 n.4, 281 N.W.2d at 470. The attorney, who initiated contact with the union
agent by telephone, did arrange an in-person meeting with the agent. 401 Mich. at 539, 258
N.W.2d at 452.
117. 407 Mich. at 38, 281 N.W.2d at 470.
118. Three union cases decided by the Supreme Court are particularly relevant to the
attorney solicitation issue. United Transp. Union v. Michigan Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971) (union
has basic first amendment right to engage in group legal activity such as recommending attorneys to injured union members); United Mine Workers v. Illinois St. Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.
217 (1967) (union has first amendment right to hire attorney to represent its members);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1963) (similar to United Transportation). In all three of these cases, state bar associations sought injunctions against the
union legal activity. See also, Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 101 S. Ct. 2193 (1981) (three union
cases cited in case striking an order prohibiting attorneys from soliciting potential class mem-
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Ohralik is more appropriate, however, when the attorney's primary motivation
is financial, rather than associational."19
As the Jaques and Teichner cases demonstrate, there are situations where
in-person solicitation of accident victims should be constitutionally protected.
Even though the Ohralik decision explicitly approved the use of prophylactic
regulations,1 20 state rulemakers would be mistaken to read Ohralik as endorsing
a total ban on in-person solicitation of accident victims.12, Any total prohibition would sweep too broadly,122 and therefore would violate the test laid down
in Central Hudson. 23 More specifically, a total prohibition would not be the
least restrictive means of achieving the state objective of preventing overreach24
ing by attorneys.1
Other Forms of In-PersonSolicitation
ForProfit
Although direct in-person solicitation of accident victims presents clear
dangers in many circumstances, there are numerous situations in which inperson solicitation can occur quite harmlessly. Nevertheless, solicitation under
these latter situations has traditionally been banned by state codes of ethics. 25
For example, if an attorney attends a cocktail party, most current state codes
prohibit him from soliciting employment from any guest there, even if all the
guests are sophisticated businessmen. The decision in Ohralik mandates, howbers in a race discrimination case); Huber, supra note 15, at 568 (suggesting that these three
union cases stand for proposition that attorney discipline cannot be used to restrict people's
access to courts).
119. Cf. Buise v. Hudkins, 584 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979)
(jailhouse lawyer, under Primus, may have first amendment associational rights to engage in
free writ writing for fellow prisoners).
120. 436 U.S. at 464.
121. See, e.g., In re W.T. Grant Co, 6 B.R. 762, 768 (Bankruptcy Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(interpreting Ohralik to allow total proscription of commercial solicitation); In re Carroll, 124
Ariz. 80, 85-86, 602 P.2d 1261, 1264 (1980) (attorney suspended based on Ohralik holding that
DR 2-103(A) is constitutional); Florida Bar re Amendment to Fla. Bar Code (Advertising),
880 So. 2d 435, 440 (Fla. 1980) (adopting an ethical consideration which provides: "Obviously,
a lawyer should not contact a new client, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of being retained to xepresent him for compensation"). Cf. In re American Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701,
1030 (1979) (interpreting Ohralik in medical solicitation case to allow a ban only if the
patient would be vulnerable to undue influence).
122. See Adler v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 440, 393 A.2d 1175, 1187 (1978), appeal dismissed &
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979) (Manderino, J., dissenting) (viewing Ohralik narrowly). See
also Simet, Solicitation of Public and Private Litigation Under the First Amendment, 1978
WASH. U.L.Q. 93, 108 (1978) (before Ohralik decided, arguing that Bates required invalidation of ban against in-person solicitation).
123. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
124. This is the fourth part of the Central Hudson test. The first three parts of the test
are not at issue because of the Ohralik decision. 436 U.S. at 457 (in-person solicitation is
protected by the first amendment); id. at 460-62 (the state interest in regulating attorney
solicitation is "particularly strong" and "important"); id. (regulations directly advance the
state interest in maintaining professional standards and protecting the public from potential

harm).
125.

See note 1 supra.
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ever, that the gravity of the danger posed by such a situation be investigated
independently.126
One of the main concerns of the Ohralik Court was that in-person solicitation might deny the prospective client an adequate opportunity to consider the
proposal. 127 This concern is legitimate when the emotional state of the prospective client is affected by a recent tragedy, such as an accident, but the theory
loses its vitality when the prospective client's decision-making powers are unimpaired. It would, therefore, be highly paternalistic, for example, to ban an
attorney's solicitation of a corporate officer at a cocktail party or a fellow member at a country club solely because of a fear that they may not have an ade28
quate opportunity for comparison or reflection?.
29
first
Despite the view by some that lawyers should not act like salesmen,
amendment protection should be provided to those lawyers who wish to act
like salesmen unless the situation is one in which the potential for harm is
evident. Justice Marshall, in his concurrence to Ohralik and Primus, advo!3
States
cated protection for this kind of "benign commercial solicitation."'
could at least narrowly frame their rules of conduct to ensure that the prospective client is given an adequate opportunity to reflect on whether to obtain
legal services. For example, states could forbid a lawyer from taking an official
action on behalf of a client for a specified time period during which the person
could rescind the empolyment agreement. 1 31 Such a narrowly-drawn rule would
126. 436 U.S. at 449.
127. Id. at 457.
128. See Hearn v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 431, 432 (9th Cir. 1962), cert denied, 373 U.S.
909 (1963) (lawyer not only admitted he solicited clients at country club, but also attempted
to deduct dues as a business expense); In re Cohn, 10 Ill. 2d 186, 196, 139 N.E.2d 301, 306
(1956) (Bristow, J., concurring) (explaining inability to reconcile rules against solicitation
with the condoned practice of gaining clients at country clubs); Huber, supra note 15, at 585
(soliciting at cocktail parties forbidden, yet condoned). Cf. Harbrecht, The Contemporaneous
Ownership Rule in Shareholder's Derivative Suits, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1041, 1066 n.96 (1978)
(suggesting that solicitation of typical class action derivative suit is beneficial to the corporate
system); Herr, The New Clients: Legal Services for Mentally Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L.
REv. 553, 596-97 (1979) (advocating solicitation in mental disability law). See also Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (stating that people generally will perceive their
own best interests if they are sufficiently informed); The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 198 (1978) (stating that more information can be presented by solicitation than
advertising).
129. See, e.g., Florida Bar re Amendment to Florida Bar Code (Advertising), 380 So. 2d
435, 443 (Fla. 1980) (Sundberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that
law is foremost a profession and only incidentally a way to earn a living); State v. Murrell, 74
So. 2d 221, 226 (Fla. 1954) (proclaiming that law is a noble profession, not a business);
Handler, supra note 15, at 1369 (stating that competition has gone far enough in the learned
professions). Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977) (rejecting the potential
adverse effect on professionalism as a basis to ban legal advertising); Huber, supra note 15, at
561 (contending that current ethical rules designed for an idealized America which no longer
exists).
130. 436 U.S. at 472. Cf. Pace v. State, 368 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1979) (attorney convicted
under antisolicitation statute for soliciting star athlete).
131. For the contract law principles involved here, see Rosenberg v. Levin, No. 57-530
(Fla. filed June 11, 1981) (holding that client has absolute right to fire attorney at anytime
with attorney's damages being the reasonable value of services rendered to that point);
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least restrictive
be in keeping with the Central Hudson requirement that the 32
means be used in proscribing and regulating commercial speech.
IN-PERSON SOLICITATION INVOLVING
NONCOMMERCIAL SPEECH

Solicitation involving noncommercial speech is governed by the Primus decision. A broad reading of Primus would condone in-person solicitation by attorneys for non-profit organizations if the solicitation relates to the political or
associational aims of the group. 3 3 The Primus decision emphasized, however,
4
that the solicitation by letter was a less intrusive method of communication.3
Moreover, the Court noted that the attorney had no pecuniary interest in the
litigation,3 5 but expressed no opinion as to whether an incidental pecuniary interest would have yielded a different result. 36 These reservations in the Primus
opinion leave unclear the extent to which states may regulate solicitation in3
volving noncommercial speech.' 7
The first question which arises in analyzing the constitutionality of inperson solicitation involving noncommercial speech is whether Primus would
have been decided differently had there been in-person solicitation. Although
the Court stated that the letter substantially reduced the likelihood of harm,3 8
the Court also emphasized that actual proof of harm would be required to
discipline an attorney engaging in noncommercial solicitation. 39 Accordingly,
it follows that in-person solicitation is protected under the first amendment provided there is no actual misconduct resulting in harm.
This interpretation of Primus is supported by the 1963 case of NAACP v.
Button, 40 which was heavily relied upon in Primus.'41 The Button Court struck
Fracasse v. Brent, 6 Cal. 8d 784, 494 P.2d 9, 100 Cal. Rptr. 885 (1972) (seminal case of modem
trend). See also Adler v. Epstein, 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 907 (1979) (former associates accused of intentional interference with contracts by soliciting former clients); Comment, supra note 83, at 675 (discussing client's power
to rescind contract if overreaching proved).
132. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
133. 436 U.S. at 422-25. In Ohralik, the Court also gave the Primus decision a broad
holding. 436 U.S. at 463 n.20.
134. Id. at 435.
135. Id. at 428-29.
136. Id. at 430 n.24.
137. Justice Rehnquist, in his dissenting opinion, contended that the majority opinion in
Primus was so replete with xeservations that the slightest change in the facts could result in
Court approval of a regulation absolutely prohibiting solicitation. Id. at 442 n.l (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 435-36.
139. Id. at 434.
140. 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (6-3 decision).
141. The South Carolina supreme court had distinguished Button when it imposed a
public reprimand on Ms. Primus. In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 268-69, 233 S.E.2d 301, 306 (1977).
The distinction offered was that litigation was only an incidental purpose of the NAACP in
Button, while litigation was a primary purpose of the ACLU. Id. The United States Supreme
Court found, however, that the ACLU and NAACP were essentially the same type of organizations, both interested in advancing their political beliefs. 436 U.S. at 427-28.
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down a decree forbidding solicitation by legal staff members of the NAACP on
the grounds of overbreadth.42 The Court emphasized that rules affecting basic
first amendment freedoms must be drawn precisely.. 43 The solicitation activities
engaged in by the NAACP attorneys involved in-person solicitation at meetings
prompted by letters and bulletins.144 Therefore, although the Court in Primus
never expressly approved in-person solicitation, its strong reliance on Button
should be viewed as representing tacit approval.
The second question arising under Primus is whether the protection afforded such solicitation activities would be altered where the attorneys derive
pecuniary gain. The Primus Court refused to comment on the effect of an
ACLU plan to allow the sharing of court-awarded fees between state affiliates
and cooperating attorneys.145 In Button, however, the Court noted that NAACP
attorneys are usually paid.141' Moreover, the Court in Primus stated that merely
because legal fees may be awarded by a court does not lead to a presumption
that pecuniary gain is the motivating factor behind the litigation.' 47 The central issue to be determined, therefore, should be whether pecuniary gain is an
incidental or primary factor in the solicitation. If the pecuniary gain is an
incidental factor, Primus should be applicable and an actual harm standard
employed. If the pecuniary gain is a primary factor, then Ohralik's foresee4
ability of harm standard should be controlling.
'ELEPHONE

SOLICITATION

No attorney discipline case has focused on the possible distinction between
uninvited in-person solicitation and solicitation either by telephone or preceded
by a telephone call.14 9 A telephone call involves personal contact, but does not
require the face-to-face contact of in-person solicitation. The Ohralik opinion
focused on the dangers of in-person solicitation, such as the exertion of undue
50
Thus, the
pressure and the possible demand for an immediate response.
142.

371 U.S. at 444.

143.
144.

Id. at 438.
Id. at 421-22.

145.

436 U.S. at 430 n.24.

146. 371 U.S. at 420.
147. 436 U.S. at 430-31.
148. Class action litigation typically involves problems of determining an attorney's true
motivation. The United States Supreme Court recently declined to specify standards under
the first amendment to govern class actions, but it did, in a race discrimination case, rule that
an order prohibiting solicitation of class members was unconstitutional. Gulf Oil Co. v.

Bernard, 101 S. Ct. 2193, 2201 (1981). See note 82 supra.
149. Cf. Greenberg v. Michigan Optometric Ass'n, 483 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mich. 1980)
(upholding regulation forbidding optometrists from soliciting by telephone). Many lawyer
solicitation cases have involved telephone communications, but no court has focused attention
on that aspect of the case. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978)
(attorney made initial telephone call to one victim's parents); In re Jaques, 401 Mich. 516,
539, 258 N.W.2d 443, 452 (1977) (attorney telephoned union's business agent to discuss possible representation of injured union members); Brief for Appellant at 3, Pace v. State, 368 So.

2d 340 (Fla. 1979) (attorney telephoned high school athlete and several days later made
personal visit to athlete's home).

150.

436 U.S. at 457.
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critical question is whether a telephone call presents a likely danger of undue
pressure or a demand for an immediate response. 51 As in the case of in-person
solicitation, the answer to this question could well turn on the emotional state
of the recipient at the time of the solicitation. When a lawyer of ordinary
prudence 5 2 would be aware that a person is susceptible to pressure because of
a certain emotional state, the dangers of telephone solicitation could be considered quite similar to the dangers of in-person solicitation. This analogy is
particularly applicable since oral agreements can be as binding as written agreements.1 53 The dangers fade quickly, however, when the person being solicited
possesses adequate decision-making capabilities with which to evaluate lawyer
advances.
While the question under Ohralik is whether the telephone call poses the
potential for substantive evils, 1 5 4 the further inquiry under Central Hudson is
whether a ban on telephone solicitation is more extensive than is necessary to
serve the state interest.15 A total ban would seem to be more extensive than
necessary in solicitation situations involving persons with rational decisionmaking powers. 156 Further, the Supreme Court's acknowledgement that the
free flow of commercial information deserves first amendment protection 57
should mandate that telephone solicitation be available to those lawyers who
wish to use it.58
DIEcT MAIL SOLICITATION FOR PROFIT
As with in-person and telephone solicitation, most current state codes of
ethics forbid most solicitation by mail. The lone exception to this prohibition
allows lawyers to mail brief professional announcement cards concerning a
change in the lawyer's association to other lawyers, clients, former clients, personal friends and relatives.159 The primary concern with direct mail communications is that untruthful information can go undetected when delivered

151. See generally Comment, Attorney Solicitation Under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments, 53 Tuz.LANE L. REv. 617, 628 (1979) (comparing telephone solicitation to direct
mail and in-person solicitation).
152. Justice Marshall, concurring in Ohralik and Primus,used the phrase "ordinary prudence" in condemning the actions of Mr. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 469. See Note, supra note 83, at

1199 (discussing a standard of ordinary prudence in attorney solicitation area).
153. In Ohralik, the attorney claimed that one of the victims entered into a binding oral
contract. 436 U.S. at 451-52.

154. Id. at 464.
155.

100 S. Ct. at 2351. See note 54 and accompanying text, supra.

156. The Central Hudson Court stated that complete suppression cannot be approved in
the absence of a showing that more limited regulation would be ineffective. 100 S. Ct. at 2354.
157. Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. at 454; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at
384; Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).

158. See text accompanying notes 217-248 infra.
159. See ABA CODE

OF

PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmiLrry DR 2-102(A)(2) (1979). Other than

this regulation concerning the mailing of announcement cards, mail communications are
governed by DR 2-103(A), the general provision forbidding the self-recommendation .of em,
ployment. See note 1 supra.
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through private channels.', 0 The Primus opinion pointed out, however, that
the physical existence of a letter substantially reduces the states' burden of enforcing disciplinary rules.161 In accordance with the Primus view, less restrictive
measures than a total ban' 6 ' could easily be employed by the states. 163 For example, states could require that copies of any solicitation letter be sent to a
state agency, thus placing the enforcement problem on a level similar to the
advertising problem in Bates. 64
Mail solicitation circumvents the states' traditional argument that solicitation allows insufficient time for the layman to consider the attorney's request. 65
The use of direct mail gives he recipient time to contemplate the proposal, and
requires no demand whatsoever for an immediate response.'66 State rules could
all but eliminate the potential for coercion in this area by forbidding an attorney from pursuing the solicitation unless the recipient initiates further con16 7
tact.
The solicited person's privacy interest has also been asserted to justify a ban
on direct mail communications.68 The Supreme Court, however, recently rejected this interest in connection with mail regulations. 69 Although the case
was not concerned with commercial speech by attorneys, 7 0 the Court stated
that "all persons" are free to mail letters to private homes.17 ' The Court
reasoned that mere speculation concerning an invasion of a person's privacy is
not a compelling state interest.'1 2 Furthermore, the Court noted that invasions
of privacy could be easily avoided because the recipient could merely throw
17 8
the letter away.
The traditional ban on mail solicitation has been challenged seven times
since Ohralik was decided, with two state courts ruling direct mail solicitation
160. See ABA COIMM. ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL
243 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 DISCUSSION DRAFT].

161.

436 U.S. at 435-36.

162.

See note 54 and accompanying text, supra.

STANDARDS,

1981 DiscussioN

DRAFT

163. See Koffier v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 148-50, 412 N.E.2d 927, 932-33 (1980);
1981 DiscussiON DRAFT, supra note 160.

164. See 1981 DISCUSsiON DRAFT, supra note 160. Cf. Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 1981 Fla.
L.W. 613, 614 (Fla. Oct. 23, 1981) (contending that a filing requirement could be both impractical and unenforceable).
165. 436 U.S. at 457.

166.

See Matter of Am. Medical Ass'n, 94 F.T.C. 701, 1030 n.93 (1979) (acknowledging

potential dangers of in-person medical solicitation but declining to see any comparable
dangers with respect to written communications). But see Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 1981 Fla.
L.W. 613, 614 (Fla. Oct. 23, 1981) (contention that a letter from an attorney has a "special
aura" which would prevent a person from taking it lightly).

167. See 1980 Kutak Report, Rule 9.3(b)(2), note 223 infra.
168. See 1981 DiscussoN DRAFr, supra note 160.
169. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 2335-36 (1980).
170. Id. at 2330. The case involved a utility company that used an insert included in all
customers' bills to outline its position on nuclear power. Id.

171. Id. at 2336.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2335-36. But cf. Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (recognizing special privacy interests of persons in their homes); Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 1981 Fla.
L.W. 613, 614 (Fla. Oct. 23, 1981) (contending that a letter could be "highly intrusive").
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is constitutionally protected commercial speech 174 and four state courts 75 and
one federal court'76 declaring it is not protected. The rationales expressed by
the seven different courts clearly reflect the confusion generated by their attempt to apply the vague principles of Ohralik and Bates and Central Hudson
to direct mail communications. The Kentucky Supreme Court, which has traditionally been tolerant of solicitation techniques, 7 relied on Bates in refusing
78
to discipline two attorneys who had mailed letters to real estate agencies.
Because the letters merely advised the agencies of the lawyers' price and method
of doing title work, the court reasoned the letters were more like advertising
than solicitation. 79 Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals 80 refused to
discipline lawyers who had mailed letters to 7,500 property owners regarding
legal representation during the sale of their homes. 81 Applying the Central
Hudson test,' 82 the court ruled that a total ban was more extensive than neces83
sary to guard against the potential for harm.
174. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978); Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n,
51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927 (1980). See also In re Madsen, 68 Il. 2d 472, 370 N.E.2d 199
(1977) (mass mailings to present clients protected).
175. Eaton v. Supreme Court of Ark., 607 S.W.2d 55 (Ark. 1980); Florida Bar v. Schreiber,
1981 Fla. L.W. 613 (Fla. Oct. 23, 1981); Allison v. Louisiana St. Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489 (La.
1978); In re R.Mj., 609 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. 1980) (en banc), rev'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 4185 (U.S. Jan.

25, 1982).
176. Matter of W.T. Grant Co., 6 B.R. 762 (Bankruptcy Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1980).
177. E.g., Louisville Bar Ass'n v. Hubbard, 282 Ky. 734, 739, 139 S.W.2d 773, 775 (1940)
(attorney allowed to solicit business in person so long as he does not take advantage of the
prospective client) (dictum). Cf. Petition of Hubbard, 267 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1954) (citing
Louisville Bar's dictum with approval but refusing to follow it where attorney solicited other
attorneys). See generally Note, Solicitation by Attorneys: A Prediction and a Recommendation,
16 Hous. L. REv. 452, 454 (1979).
178. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978).
179. Id. The Kentucky Bar Association's Board of Governors had recommended a public
reprimand for violation of Kentucky's version of ABA CODE OF PROFEssiONAL REsPONSnBILrrY
DR 2-103(A). Id. Kentucky's rule is similar to the Model Code rule. See note I supra.
180. The New York Court of Appeals is the highest state court in New York.
181. Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 142, 412 N.E.2d 927, 929 (1980). The attorneys had also mailed letters to real estate brokers, but the New York Court of Appeals
deferred ruling on whether those communications were protected by the first amendment. Id.
at 143, 412 N.E.2d at 950. Cf. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978) (letters
to real estate agencies given first amendment protection). The main concern when dealing
with letters to real estate brokers should be to avoid an agency relationship between the
broker and the attorney. If the attorney promises the broker a commission for every person
who chooses the attorney to handle their dosing, ethical problems would arise because the
attorney could potentially circumvent valid antisolicitation rules through the use of the
broker. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(2) (1979). However, if
the attorney merely advises the broker of his law practice, as was done in Stuart, then the
broker has no pecuniary interest in the selection of an attorney by buyers and sellers, and the
risk of overreaching is all but eliminated.
182. See note 54 and accompanying text, supra.
183. 51 N.Y.2d at 149-50, 412 N.E.2d at 932-33. The facts of the case also demonstrated
that advertising in newspapers was not an adequate alternative. The attorneys claimed newspaper ads were relatively ineffective whereas the letters sent directly to potential sellers resulted in about 200 clients. Id. at 150-51, 412 N.E.2d at 934. Cf. Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 1981
Fla. L.W. 613, 614 (Fla. Oct. 23, 1981) (contending that public advertisements are an adequate alternative).
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The Missouri Supreme Court refused to apply Central Hudson, expressing
displeasure with what it referred to as the United States Supreme Court's
"subjective ad hoc judgments" in the commercial speech area. 84 The other
four courts basically relied on Ohralik in approving bans on direct mail solicitation. Although the Louisiana Supreme Court admitted that mail solicitation
did not present the dangers of in-person solicitation, the court reasoned that
since the solicitation was still direct, it was subject to proscription based on
Ohralik.'s5 The Arkansas Supreme Court ruled that an attorney advertisement
included in a packet of coupons mailed to 10,000 households could be viewed
as impermissible solicitation.186 Likewise, the Florida supreme court 87 and a

federal bankruptcy court 88 ruled that a solicitation letter was unprotected because it was for commercial purposes.
The decisions of these seven courts demonstrate that direct mail solicitation
does not fit neatly into any category previously addressed by the Supreme

184. In re R.M.J. 609 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Mo. 1980) (en banc), prob. juris. noted, 101
S. Ct. 3028 (1981). The court privately reprimanded an attorney who, among other things,
mailed announcement letters to strangers regarding the opening of his law office. Id. Under
the analysis set forth in this note, the United States Supreme Court should reverse the Missouri supreme court and grant first amendment protection to direct mail communications. See
In re R.M.J., 50 U.S.L.W. 4189-90 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1982) (applying the Central Hudson test in
reversing the Missouri Supreme Court).
185. Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978). In Allison, attorneys
sought to enjoin enforcement of ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103, see
note 1 supra, after the Louisiana Bar announced an investigation of the attorneys. The attorneys had mailed letters to various employers in an effort to sell a prepaid legal services
plan to them. 362 So. 2d at 489. In a concurring opinion, which sounded more like a dissent,
Justice Tate argued that Bates was more applicable than Ohralik. He emphasized four points:
society's interest in receiving truthful information, the attorney's first amendment right to
communicate, the social desirability of the prepaid legal services plan, and the sophistication
of the employers who received the letter. Although he then proceeded to join the majority,
he did recommend that DR 2-103, supra, be modified. Id. at 496-97 (Tate, J., concurring).
186. Eaton v. Supreme Court of Ark., 607 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Ark. 1980). The ad listed a $10
initial consultation fee and a broad range of areas in which the attorney practiced. The court
imposed a private reprimand. Id. at 55. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 372 n.26
(viewing with approval the advertising of an initial consultation fee).
187. Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 1981 Fla. L. W. 613 (Fla. Oct. 23, 1981). The court reversed a decision by a Florida Bar referee who had granted the attorney first amendment
protection. The attorney had mailed a four-sentence letter to an international trade company
informing it of his expertise in immigration law. Id. at 613, 615 n.I. This factual situation
represents a clear example of the type of direct mail communication that deserves protection
under the analysis of this note. Cf. id. at 615 (Overton, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). The attorney's case was remanded for further disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 615.
The attorney stated afterward that the issue would not be resolved until the United States
Supreme Court issues a ruling. Gainesville Sun, Oct. 23, 1981, at 2B, col. 1-2.
188. Matter of W.T. Grant Co., 6 B.R. 762, 768-69 (Bankruptcy Ct. S.D.N.Y. 1980). In
that case, an injunction was issued prohibiting five holders of debentures from sending a
letter of solicitation to 2,300 other holders. Id. at 764. Explicit findings were made that the
proposed letter was misleading and incomplete, id. at 772-73, thus strengthening the court's
statement that the debentureholders would be subject to precisely the type of detrimental
influence envisioned by the attorney antisolicitation rules. Id. at 771.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1981

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 5 [1981], Art. 3
1981]

PROTECTION FOR ATTORNEY

SOLICITATION

Court." " ' Direct mail is similar to advertising in that it is a written communication unaccompanied by personal contact.1 90 Yet it also has an element of
solicitation because it is directed to a specific person rather than to the public
at large.19 1 Attempting to attach a specific label to direct mail communications
for constitutional purposes, however, would be a mistake.1 9 2 The Supreme
Court has never stated that advertising is protected and solicitation is not. On
the contrary, the Court admitted in Ohralik that solicitation is protected under
the first amendment.9s The Court emphasized, however, that in-person solicitation may be subject to more stringent regulation than advertising because of
the differences between the two of types of conduct. - 4 Accordingly, direct mail
communications are subject to regulation, but those regulations must be based
on a balancing of the state's interest in preventing potential harm, the public's
interest in the free flow of commercial information, and the attorney's interest

in communicating the information. 195
This balancing test requires the application of the principles enunciated in
both Bates and Ohralik. Under Bates, 98 any direct mail communication should
be protected by the first amendment if it contains only truthful prices of
routine legal services.197 Under Ohralik,98 direct mail communication should
be protected if the information is not likely to mislead or endanger the recipient. Because the receipt of mail itself presents no special dangers, 9 9 mail
regulations under Ohralik should be limited to proscribing actual misconduct
such as misrepresentations and untrue statements. 20 Therefore, if the letter is
189. Koffler v. Joint Bar Ass'n, 51 N.Y.2d 140, 146, 412 N.E.2d 927, 931 (1980) (stating
that there was no United'States Supreme Court case on point).
190. See note 13 supra.
191. Id.
192. See 1981 DIscUssION DAFTr, supra note 160, at 244. Cf. Commercial Carrier Corp. v.
Indian River County, 371 So. 2d 1010, 1020 (Fla. 1979) ("the temptation is strong to fall back
on semantic labels for ease of application and seeming certainty').
193. 436 U.S. at 457, 459. Advertising by lawyers is protected under Bates. 433 U.S. at 384.
194. 436 U.S. at 457, 459.
195. Id. Cf. Durham v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213, 222 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (Bates was not
a decision for the benefit of the bar; it was for the benefit of consumers); Harris v. Beneficial,
338 So. 2d 196, 198 (Fla. 1976) (the key to commercial speech is the consumer's interest);
Allison v. Louisiana St. Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489, 496 (La. 1978) (court downplays attorney's
own right to speak freely in commercial solicitation cases); Comment, supra note 45, at 809
(discussing whether first amendment right of speaker is ignored in commercial speech cases).
196. See note 15 and accompanying text, supra.
197. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933, 934 (Ky. 1978) (letters contained factual information only; no words of solicitation used).
198. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
199. See text accompanying notes 171-172 supra. It could be argued that the victim of a
recent tragedy could be in such an emotional, physical, or mental state to justify a complete
ban on all communications. This argument is too weak, however, when applied to direct mail
communications. With a letter, there is little chance of pressure or coercion and there is no
demand for an immediate response, or any response at all. Moreover, the victim of a recent
tragedy is often times in desperate need of legal advice, therefore, information about legal
services is necessary. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. at 375 (court viewing as dubious
any rule based on the benefits of public ignorance). Cf. Ohralik v. Ohio St. Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. at 459 n.16 (discussing related problem of solicitation of releases by insurance claims
agents).
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truthful and nonthreatening and merely conveys information about legal services or invites the recipient to enter into a legal relationship, it should be given
first amendment protection.01
SOLICITATIONq FOR PROFIT THROUGH THE MEDIA

The Supreme Court has never directly addressed lawyer advertising by radio
and television. The Bates decision was expressly limited to allowing newspaper
advertisments,202 but the Court reserved judgment on the merits of radio and
television advertising because such advertising would present "special problems" and would warrant "special consideration."20

Despite this reservation,

the American Bar Association amended its Model Code of Professional Responsibility following the Bates decision to allow radio and television advertising of certain information.204 As a result, it is likely that most states will amend
their codes 2° s to allow these forms of attorney advertising. Such amendments
would be consistent with the first amendment principles applied to newspaper
20 6

advertisements in Bates.
An advertisement directed at a specific group, however, presents a separate
constitutional issue. The advertisement in Bates was directed to the public at
large; 20 7 no consideration was given by the Court to advertisements directed at
specific individuals. Consider, for example, a newspaper, radio or television
advertisement which begins with the following statement: "Attention: Victims
of Yesterday's Train Accident." The advertisement includes the name of a

local attorney, his qualifications in the personal injury field, and the type of fee
arrangement that he employs. Under the Model Code,2 0 an attorney can advertise a wide range of information, but the opening statement to this type of
ad is more akin to solicitation than to information giving. Neither the advertising provisions nor the solicitation provisions in the Model Code provide
20 9
for this type of direct solicitation technique.
200. Actual misconduct would include any communication by a lawyer who knows or has
reason to know that the prospective client is in such a condition making him unlikely to be
capable of exercising reasonable judgment. See note 231 & 234 and accompanying text, infra.
201. See Note, Lawyer Solicitation: The Effect of Ohralik and Primus, 13 SUFFOLK U.L.
REv. 960, 976-79 (1979) (suggesting that solicitation by mail should be allowed).
202. 433 U.S. at 384.
203. Id.
204. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1979).
205. Florida amended its code in 1980 to allow radio and television advertising. Florida
Bar re Amendment to Florida Bar Code (Advertising), 380 S. 2d 435 (Fla. 1980). The current chief justice of the Florida supreme court objected strongly to the amendment based, in
part, on the reservation expressed in Bates about radio and television advertising. Id. at
442-43 (Sundberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
206. Despite the Court's reservation in Bates, there does not appear to be a significant
difference between a truthful advertisement in a newspaper and the same or similar information being conveyed over the radio or television. As a result, if the Court were presented with
a radio or television advertisement case, the outcome would most likely follow the same
principles enunciated in Bates.
207. 433 U.S. at 385.

208. ABA
209.

CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DR 2-101(B)(l)-(25).

See note 1 supra.
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The Arizona supreme court briefly addressed the constitutionality of a radio
advertisement directed at families of victims of a violent gas explosion in
Matter of Carroll.210 The court declined to make the ad the basis of disciplinary

action,2 1 but indicated that Bates provided protection for radio advertisements
even though the limits of the protection were undear.2 2 In its brief discussion
of the issue, the Arizona court failed to recognize that the radio advertisement
did not solicit employment; it merely offered plane transportation to area
hospitals. The Code does not forbid unsolicited advice or unsolicited offers of
help, but it does forbid the acceptance of employment as a result of advice to
anyone to
obtain a lawyer. 213 Therefore, since the ad in Carroll never advised
214
obtain a lawyer, there should have been no solicitation problem.
As in the case of direct mail solicitation the use of labels such as "advertising" and "solicitation" creates problems in analyzing this type of directlytargeted media communication. Once again, the better approach would be to
apply the principles of both Bates and Ohralik to this commercial speech
problem. The two key considerations should be whether the communication
was truthful 21 , and whether the recipient was afforded an adequate opportunity
to reflect on the decision to seek the lawyer's services. 216 If both questions can
be answered in the affirmative, the communication should be given first amendment protection.
PRoPosALs FOR NEw CODES oF ETHics
Current state codes of ethics related to solicitation are inadequate if they
follow the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility.21 7 Those state codes which include blanket prohibitions against most forms

of solicitation violate the requirement in first amendment commercial speech
cases that rules be no more extensive than necessary. 218 Likewise, blanket pro210. 124 Ariz. 80, 602 P.2d 461 (1979). The text of the ad read: "One of the investigators
in Kingman [site of the explosion] on behalf of a Phoenix law firm has offered free transportation by air to family members of the men still in the hospitals in Phoenix and Las Vegas.
The plane can carry three passengers and a pilot. For more information . .. call [the investigator] or call the pilot .. " 124 Ariz. at 82 n.1, 602 P.2d at 463 n.l.
211. The attorney was disciplined, however, because, among other things, the investigator
had personally solicited a victim. Id. at 85-86, 602 P.2d at 466-67. The presence of these other
grounds for discipline could have been the main reason the court so hastily dismissed the
radio advertisement issue.
212. Id.
213. See note 1 supra.
214. Of course, an obvious purpose of offering free rides to family members would be to
acquaint them with the lawyer. This is a form of indirect solicitation, but it, alone, is hardly
coercive. Some further action by the attorney, such as a high-pressure sales pitch enroute to
the hospital, could be the basis for discipline, but not the ad alone.
215. See note 16 and accompanying text, supra.
216. See note 84 and accompanying text, supra. Cf. in re American Medical Ass'n, 94
F.T.C. 701, 1030 n.93 (1979) (expressing view that in-person medical solicitation poses dangers,
but no comparable dangers exist if the solicitation is through written communication or other

media).
217. See note 1 supra.
218. See note 54 and accompanying text, supra.
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hibitions run afoul of the actual harm standard dictated by Primus for noncommercial speech situations. 219 A few jurisdictions have even considered allowing all types of solicitation provided that actual harm to the prospective
client does not occur. One jurisdiction has already adopted such a code provision.220 This is an even more liberal position than that demanded by
Ohralik.221

In light of recent first amendment decisions, the ABA's Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards (Kutak Commission) is currently reviewing the entire Model Code, and significant changes are being recommended
in the area of solicitation.2 2 2- That group released a discussion draft in early
1980223 entitled Model Rules of Professional Conduct 2z4 and a final draft was

released in June of 1981. 2 25 The 1980 and 1981 drafts are similar, except that
written communications are primarily treated under "solicitation" in the 1980
2 26
draft whereas they are treated chiefly under "advertising" in the 1981 draft.
Under the latest proposal, the Kutak Commission recommends that personal
contact be limited to Primus-type situations and situations involving close
219. See note 139 and accompanying text, supra.

220.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

DR 2-103 (1980) states:

Solicitation of Professional Employment.
(A) A lawyer shall not seek, by in-person contact, his or her employment (or employment of a partner or associate) by a non-lawyer who has not sought his or her advice regarding employment of a lawyer, if:
(1) The solicitation involves use of a statement or claim that is false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive within the meaning of DR 2-101(B); or
(2) The solicitation involves the use of undue influence; or
(3) The potential client is apparently in a physical or mental condition which would
make it unlikely that he or she could exercise reasonable, considered judgment as to the
selection of a lawyer.
California considered liberalizing its ethics rules in 1978. PROPosEi RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, reprinted in State Bar of California Reports 4-6

(August, 1978). The California Board of Governors, however, ultimately adopted a rule with
only one significant change: Solicitation by mail seeking employment generally would be
permissible. RULE 2-101(B), RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
Resolution Adopted by the Board of Governors of the State Bar of California (Nov. 17, 1978).
See generally Note, Attorney Solicitation: The Scope of State Regulation After Primus and
Ohralik, 12 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 144, 181-86 (1978) (discussing the California proposal).
221. Some commentators have criticized the Ohralik Court for not adopting an actual
harm standard. The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 128, at 200; Note, supra note 177,
at 479. Cf. In re Carroll, 124 Ariz. 80, 86, 602 P.2d 461, 467 (1979) (attorney suspended for
soliciting despite showing of no actual harm).
222. J. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 67-160 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).
223. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (draft 1980), reprinted in J. MORGAN &
R. ROTUNDA, supra note 223, at 67-160.

224. Id.
225. The 1981 Final Draft is available from the National Center for Professional Responsibility, 77 S. Wacker Drive, Chicago, Il. 60606. The ABA House of Delegates is
scheduled to consider adoption of the new code in 1982. Letter from Professor Geoffrey C.
Hazard Jr., Reporter for the Kutak Commission (June 29, 1981).
226.

Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 223, with Model Rules

of Professional Conduct 186-97 (1981 prop. final draft).
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The Commission's proposal em-

phasizes that a lawyer shall not contact a prospective client in-person or by mail
in situations similar to the typical "ambulance chasing" case where it is reasonable to assume the physical, emotional or mental state of the person is such that
22 8
their decision-making powers are impaired.

This "ambulance chasing" prohibition consistently applies the Ohralik
decision. 229 The proposal fails, however, to provide for the opposite situation
where the person's physical, emotional and mental state are sufficient to exercise reasonable judgment. To be consistent with Ohralik, the proposal should
recognize situations where in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain is not
likely to pose the type of dangers which justify the "ambulance chasing" provision.230 Moreover, even in the case of accident victims, there are situations
where the physical, emotional, and mental state of the victim is such that
rational decision-making is possible. For example, the persons solicited in
Teichner2al and Jaques 23 2 were capable of rational decision-making. Furthermore, the less intrusive methods of direct mail and telephone communication
should be allowed for the rationally-thinking victim.233 Although allowing

direct mail communication in the rational victim situation seems to be implied
in the Kutak proposal, 2 4 a dearer statement supporting this implication should
be made. Moreover, the proposal fails to deal explicitly with telephone communications, an omission which can only lead to disputes over the proper application of the "personal contact" rules.
CONCLUSION

Regulation of solicitation is proper; complete suppression is not. Accordingly, the Kutak Commission's proposal represents a vast improvement over
the Model Code's blanket prohibitions of most types of solicitation.235 Amend227. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(a)(1) (proposed final draft).
228. ABA MODEL RULrs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(b)(1) (proposed final draft).
Although this provision will be referred to as an "ambulance chasing" regulation, there are
situations other than personal injury and wrongful death cases where the provision may be
applied. See, e.g., In re Perrello, 260 Ind. 254, 295 N.E. 2d 357, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973)
(attorney suspended for soliciting clients in corridor of courthouse just prior to court appearances); In re Smith, 5 B.R. 92 (Bankruptcy Ct. 1980) (court recommended discipline of
attorney who solicited persons in financial plight).
229. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
230. See notes 83-132 and accompanying text, supra.
231. See notes 100-120 and accompanying text, supra.
232. See notes 112-120 and accompanying text, supra.
233. Determining whether a person possesses rational decision-making powers is a factual
question. Courts, therefore, should avoid per se rules such as: "Any form of solicitation in
hospitals is prohibited." While prohibiting unannounced personal visits at hospitals is dearly
a permissible prophylactic regulation under Ohralik, prohibiting direct mail communications
would appear to be broader than necessary where the injured party's faculties are not impaired. As long as a person is capable of exercising reasonable judgment, some manner of
solicitation should be available to the lawyer who wishes to solicit.
234. ABA MODEL RUEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUcr Rule 7.3(b)(1) (proposed final draft),
forbids direct mail communication if the person is likely in an impaired condition. Otherwise, direct mail communications are allowed under Rule 7.2(a).

235. See note 1 supra.
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ments should be made, however, to harmonize the Code with the first amendment as interpreted in Bales, Ohralik, Primus, and Central Hudson. The
Kutak proposal ignores the first amendment by failing to provide protection
for solicitations occurring under circumstances in which the prospective client
possesses rational decision-making powers. That discrepancy could be remedied
by adding that personal solicitation is proper "if the lawyer knows, or it is
reasonable to assume, that the person solicited is capable of rational decisionmaking." The provision should further state that the lawyer shall not continue
any solicitation effort if at any time during the solicitation he realizes, or should
realize, that the person is not capable of exercising reasonable judgment.
Rules that affect first amendment rights should be drafted carefully to impose a burden no greater than is necessary on those asserting their rights.2 36
Because commercial speech has been recognized as deserving first amendment
protection, 23 7 courts and state bar associations should thoroughly review current ethics codes with an aim toward adopting narrowly-drawn regulations.
The primary goal should be to allow solicitation, either in-person, by mail or
telephone, in situations where the recipient is capable of exercising reasonable
judgment. Reasonable time, place and manner restrictions have traditionally
been approved in first amendment cases, 238 but complete suppression is much

more than a restriction; it is a denial of those first amendment rights. Moreover, it is a denial based on the benefits of public ignorance, a position
antithetical to basic first amendment theory239
ROBERT ANTHONY
236.

See Simet, supra note 122, at 108 (contending that even though rules may become

more complex, that is a slight burden to protect first amendment rights).
237. See note 5 supra.
238. See cases cited at note 93 supra.
239. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 365, 375 (1977).
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